Towards Proceduralisation of Private Law in the European Multi-Level System by Joerges, Christian & Schmid, Christoph
www.ssoar.info
Towards Proceduralisation of Private Law in the
European Multi-Level System
Joerges, Christian; Schmid, Christoph
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Joerges, C., & Schmid, C. (2010). Towards Proceduralisation of Private Law in the European Multi-Level System.
(ZERP-Arbeitspapier, 3). Bremen: Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik (ZERP) an der Universität Bremen. https://
nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-62519-5
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
ZENTRUM FÜR EUROPÄISCHE RECHTSPOLITIK 
Universität Bremen 
ZERP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian Joerges∗∗ / Christoph Schmid*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Towards Proceduralisation of Private Law in 
the European Multi-Level System  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZERP-Working Paper 3/2010 
                                                 
∗∗  Research Professor, University of Bremen, Centre of European Law and Politics 
(ZERP) and Collaborative Research Centre Transformations of the State. 
***  Professor of European Private and Economic Law, University of Bremen, Centre of 
European Law and Politics (ZERP). 
 The essay is based upon the contribution of Christian Joerges to the previous 
edition (‘On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Private Law: Considerations on 
a Law of Justi(ce)-fication (justum facere) for the EU Multi-level System’, 
159-190, and the condensed version of this essay (‘Europeanisation as Process: 
Thoughts on the Europeanisation of Private Law”, European Public Law 11 
(2005): 62-82). It is at the same time a product of the intense cooperation of 
the two authors over more than a decade. Co-operation is not a merger of aca-
demic identities. We share many premises and differ nevertheless program-
matically in our views on a number of issues. We refrain from discussing these 
differences here and simply underline that the conflict of laws approach we 
submit here is compatible with assigning functions of smooth an gradual con-
vergence to a European code prepared by an adequate transnational forum such 
as a European Law Institute as advocated inter alia by Ch. Schmid, ‘Legiti-
macy Conditions of a European Civil Code’, Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 8 (2001): 277; recently further developed in idem, ‘A 
European Civil Code as a Building Block of a Common Identity?, review es-
say on: H. Collins, The European Civil Code’, European Review of Contract 
Law 2010 (forthcoming) and idem, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts 
durch die EU, epilogue, 2010 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, forthcoming). 
 
 
 
 
    Editorial 
 
Publisher & Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik  
Distributor: Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft  
Universität Bremen  
Universitätsallee, GW 1  
28359 Bremen 
www.zerp.eu 
  
Reproduction: Subject to editor’s permission 
  
ISSN (Internet): 1868-7520 
  
Bremen, January 2010 
 Contents 
Preliminary Remark...................................................................................................... 1 
I.  Core Thesis and Structure of the Argument ........................................................ 2 
II. The Irresolvable Contest of Legal Disciplines .................................................... 7 
II.1 European Law ............................................................................................ 8 
II.2  Comparative Law..................................................................................... 10 
II.3  Private International Law......................................................................... 13 
III. The Misery of Methodological Nationalism and the Need for a 
Reconceptualisation of Europe’s Postnational Constellation............................ 15 
III.1  Multi-level Governance as Analytical Paradigm in European Studies .... 15 
III.2  A New Conflicts Law as Response to the Misery of Methodological 
Nationalism ............................................................................................... 17 
III.3  Democracy and Private Law in the European Union ............................... 18 
IV. Exempla Trahunt: Three Patterns of Europeanisation of Private Law.............. 19 
IV.1  Product Liability Law: On the Decoupling of Consumer Protection  
from Its Social Fabric and Objectives....................................................... 20 
IV.2  Company Law: Co-Original Economic Freedoms and Political  
Processes ................................................................................................... 25 
IV.3  Altmark Trans: Diagonal Conflicts in the European Multi-level  
System....................................................................................................... 29 
V.  Verba Docent: On the Procedural Legitimacy of the Europeanisation  
Process ............................................................................................................... 32 
V.1  Transforming the Analytics of Multi-level Governance into Legal 
Categories.................................................................................................. 33 
V.2  The Idea of a Three-dimensional European Conflicts Law...................... 33 
V.3  Constitutionalisation Through Proceduralisation ..................................... 35 
Epilogue: Conflicts Law, Proceduralisation and ‘Social Justice’ in Europe’s  
Private Law?............................................................................................................... 36 
 
 

 1
Preliminary Remark 
Academic debates on the Europeanisation of private law have intensified since 
the publication of the last edition of the present volume, and the practical in-
volvement of European institutional actors has become stronger. Intensity and 
strength, however, do not, by themselves, indicate consolidation and progress. 
Quite to the contrary. The future of the project of a European code of private law 
is uncertain at best. Its contours, as defined and re-defined by Europe’s institu-
tional actors, are blurring. Its evaluation is more controversial than ever. The 
new uncertainties and controversies mirror broader irritations originating in the 
wider political context in which European private law is embedded. The consti-
tutional ambitions of the European Convention have, after lengthy, cumbersome 
and contingent processes, been downgraded to a ‘Treaty on the Functioning of 
the Union’.1 The European Court of Justice, once the admired and praised motor 
of integration, has come under unheard-of attacks.2 Socio-economic diversity in 
the enlarged Union is deepening, rather than diminishing – and Europe remains 
plagued by concerns over its problem-solving potential and its acceptance 
amongst citizens. Should Europe be ‘a faltering project’ as Jürgen Habermas, its 
unconditional defender for so many years, now warns us?3 
This context is important for private law but will remain in the background 
of our analyses. We can safely assume that Europe will not fade away. What 
we also have to envisage, however, is the need to take the fortunate motto of 
the unfortunate Constitutional Treaty4 more seriously. How to accomplish Eu-
rope’s ‘unitas in diversitate’, how to reconcile the openness of national mar-
kets with differences in legal cultures, differently shaped relations between sta-
te and society, how to widen and transform the ‘integration through law’ agen-
da accordingly – all these queries are a subtext of our deliberation. 
                                                 
1  Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establis-
hing the European Community, 13 December 2007, Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 9 May 2008, OJ 2007, C 306, 1. 
2  See R. Herzog & L. Gerken, ‘Stoppt den Europäischen Gerichtshof’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung of 8/9/2008, available at <http://www.cep.eu>; F. Scharpf, ‘The 
only solution is to refuse to comply with ECJ rulings’, Social Europe Journal 4 
(2008), 16-21. 
3  Europe: The Faltering Project, translated by C. Cronin, (Cambridge MA: Polity 
Press, 2009). 
4  Art. IV-1 of the DCT, OJ 2004, C 310, 1. 
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I.  Core Thesis and Structure of the Argument  
The Europeanisation process requires orientation and guidance by a ‘law of law 
production’: this is the message which our title seeks to transmit through the no-
tion of ‘proceduralisation’. This core message continues and renews the thrust of 
the previous edition with its somewhat enigmatic notion of ‘Law of Justi(ce)-
fication (justum facere)’.5 However, this message is one of caution, a warning 
against any comprehensive substantive programming in European private law, 
and is a plea for a focus on the quality of law generation. We believe that the 
turn to proceduralisation is more important than ever, given the unruly state of 
the European Union and the severe disintegration and fragmentation processes 
which have affected European private law in recent times. Significantly, these 
extend to all three of its core spheres, or ‘lives’: the codification process, secon-
dary (mainly consumer) law, and the jurisprudence of the ECJ.6 
The first and most significant life, the preparatory process of a European 
contract or even a civil code, had started auspiciously. In the wake of the 
euphoric ‘constitutional movement’ leading to the Nice Fundamental Rights 
Charter and the Laeken mandate to elaborate a constitutional treaty, the Coun-
cil advocated the elaboration of a European contract law, and mandated the 
Commission to launch the preparatory process. As a first step, the Commission 
published the 2001 White Paper on contract law, in which different legal poli-
cy options were presented and a consultation process launched.7 The feedback 
from legal science, practice, business and politics prompted the Commission, 
in its 2003 Action Plan,8 to call for a horizontal instrument, alongside further 
measures of sector-specific integration, in order to increase the overall cohe-
rence of European private law. To this end, a ‘Common Framework of Refe-
rence’ (CFR), which was to contain common terminology, principles and rules 
on core areas of private law, was to be elaborated. The CFR should constitute 
the basis of a subsequent ‘optional instrument – a seemingly harmless neolo-
gism for a European contract code which should be applicable either through 
the parties’ choice of law (‘opt in’ solution) or as a dispositive regime for 
transnational cases if the parties had not excluded its application (the ‘opt out’ 
solution). The preparatory work was then assigned to two transnational net-
                                                 
5  Taken from R. Wiethölter, ‘Just-ifications of a Law of Society’, in Paradoxes and 
Inconsistencies in the Law, ed. O. Perez & G. Teubner (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005), 65-77. 
6  See Ch. Schmid, ‘The Three Lives of European Private Law’, ZERP-WP 2009 No. 
9, available at: www.zerp.uni-bremen.de. 
7  COM(2001), 398 final of 11.07.2001. 
8  COM(2003), 68 final of 12.02.2003. 
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works of academic experts: the so-called Study Group on a European Civil 
Code (the follow up group of the Lando group, directed by Christian von Bar), 
working on a classic comparative law basis, and the Research Group on the 
Existing EC Private Law (the ‘Acquis-Group’, directed by Hans Schulte-
Nölke), aiming at developing European private law upon the basis of the alrea-
dy existing legislative and judicial acquis in that field. The work of the groups 
was financed under the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Deve-
lopment, which was instrumentalised for this purpose. The work of the groups 
was accompanied by a so-called stakeholders network (representing civil so-
ciety) and by another network of Member State representatives. In 2008 and 
2009, these published academic drafts of the common frame of reference 
(DCFR), which resembles a comprehensive codification of contract law and its 
neighbouring fields at European level.9 The proposed rules together with 
comments and illustrations encompass around 10,000 pages. As well as ser-
ving as a tool and a source of inspiration for research and teaching, the acade-
mic DCFR is intended to provide a model for a political CFR. 
Yet, already in 2005, after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in the 
French and Dutch referenda, the political climate had changed. The Commissi-
on indicated that, from then on, it would prioritise a revision of the consumer 
contract law acquis. The latter was disconnected from the codification process 
in the following years in order to become a kind of second life of European 
private law. This trend became apparent with the 2007 Green Paper on the re-
vision of the consumer acquis. In fact, the Green Paper did not refer to the 
DCFR, which was already available unofficially at that time, though it contai-
ned a questionnaire with issues for consultation with alternative rule proposals, 
all of which had already been dealt with in the DCFR.10 This means that even 
the minimalist toolbox function of the CFR was frustrated. The scission bet-
ween the CFR process and the consumer acquis was confirmed in the 2008 
proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive (CRD).11 This scission is documen-
ted not just by the complete lack of consideration of the CFR, even in cases in 
                                                 
9  Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, ed. Study Group 
and Acquis Group, (Munich: Sellier, provisional edition 2008; full edition (6 volu-
mes), 2009). 
10  See M. Hesselink, ‘The Consumer Rights Directive and the CFR: Two Worlds A-
part?’, European Review of Contract Law 5 (2009): 290, at 294; K. Lilleholt, ‘A 
Step Backward for Consumer Protection and for Contract Law Harmonisation? No-
tes on the Proposal for a New Directive on Consumer Rights’, European Review of 
Private Law 17 (2009): 335. 
11  COM(2008) 614, 3 final of 08.10.2008. 
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which the CRD deviates from existing acquis incorporated in the CFR.12 At a 
fundamental level, the scission is also shown by the fact that the CRD, unlike 
the CFR and all other national private law instruments, deviates from the clas-
sic ethical concept of private law, which pursues justice between the parties in 
the individual case (normally commutative, sometimes also distributive justi-
ce) as the highest objective. Instead, the CRD sacrifices justice between the 
parties in favour of providing European businesses with a basic, but uniform, 
regulatory framework for market transactions with consumers. This harsh jud-
gement is based less upon the fact that the CRD diminishes the standard of 
consumer protection in many instances - not only when compared to many 
Member States, but also to the existing European acquis. Instead, it mainly de-
rives from the legal-technical consequences of the CRD’s maximum harmoni-
sation approach,13 which constitutes a straitjacket for private parties and Mem-
ber States alike. Thereby, Member States may no longer provide for stronger 
consumer protection in national law, but are strictly bound to the level foreseen 
in the Directive. The Commission has attempted to justify the need for maxi-
mum harmonisation in a 300 page impact assessment report annexed to the 
draft, which postulates huge efficiency losses in cross-border transactions due 
to persisting legal divergences. As a response, the fully-harmonised CRD 
wants to provide businesses with a single regulatory framework in order both 
to eliminate the barriers stemming from the fragmentation of the rules and to 
complete the internal market in this area.14 Contrary to the hollow propaganda 
aim of the Directive, in order to enable also consumer trust and reliance 
through a single regulatory framework, consumers were, of course, far better 
                                                 
12  To give but one striking example, Art. 12 CDR on the consumer’s right to withdra-
wal in off-premises and distance contracts, surprisingly no longer refers to the noti-
fication of the withdrawal right to the consumer as starting point of the withdrawal 
period. This is in striking contrast not only to Art. II-5:103 (2 b) and 104 DCFR, but 
also to Arts. 4 and 5 Doorstep Sales and Articles 5 and 6 Distance Sales Directive. 
13  The turn to maximum harmonisation, already applied in the 2002 Financial Services 
Distance Sales Directive, the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the 
2008 New Consumer Credit Directive, is rightly viewed as a new era in European 
consumer law by H.-W. Micklitz & N. Reich, ‘Crónica de una muerte anunciada: 
The Commission Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’, Common Market 
Law Review 46 (2009): 471. See, also, the critiques by V. Mak, ‘Review of the Con-
sumer Acquis: Towards Maximum Harmonisation?’, European Review of Private 
Law 17 (2009): 55-73, and S. Whittacker, ‘Unfair Contract Terms and Consumer 
Guarantees: the Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights and the Significance 
of ‘Maximum harmonisation’, European Review of Contract Law 5 (2009): 223. 
14  CRD, Recital 20. 
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served by a common minimum standard which could be, and actually was,15 
extended by Member States to their benefit - whereas they are now subjected 
to a reduced standard of protection even in internal cases, which amounts to a 
“McDonaldsisation” of European consumer protection.16 
The last core element of European private law, the jurisprudence of the 
ECJ, has anticipated and backed up the full harmonisation strategy, thus inc-
reasing its own power in European private law. Already in 2002, the Court in-
terpreted the early and fragmented Product Liability Directive as a full harmo-
nisation instrument. As will be shown below, this has generated devastating 
effects on private parties in the Sanchez case.17 The situation is even worse in 
European labour law, where the ECJ has applied the full harmonisation prin-
ciple to the Posted Workers Directive in Laval18 and Rüffert,19 which allowed 
undertakings incorporated in Eastern European countries to undercut wages 
stipulated by collective agreements in Western European countries and forbid-
ding the respect, up until now mandatory under regional German law for ten-
ders, for minimum wages stipulated by collective agreements. However, if la-
bour competition were to intensify at the expense of Western European wor-
kers who cannot survive in their home countries with lower Eastern European 
wages, anxieties about the ‘Polish plumber’, who was so often cited in the 
French ‘non’-campaign against the Constitutional Treaty, may eventually ma-
terialise. Never in the history of European integration has the critique of the 
Court’s jurisprudence, in particular, by trade unions, been so drastic.20 Un-
                                                 
15  For details, see the impressive EC Consumer Law Compendium, elaborated for the 
European Commission by H. Schulte-Nölke, Ch. Twig-Flessner & M. Ebers in 
2008. 
16  In this sense, N. Reich, ‘Die “McDonaldisierung” des Verbraucherrechts – oder: Von 
der “vollständigen Harmonisierung” zur vollständigen Abschaffung” eines eigenstän-
digen nationalen Verbraucherschutzrechts?’, Verbraucher und Recht (2009): 361. 
17  Case C-183/00, González Sánchez, [2002] ECR I-3901, see, below, Section IV 1; 
other cases decided along the same line include C-52/00, Commission v. France, 
[2002] ECR I-3827; C-154/00, Commission v. Greece, [2002] ECR I-3879; C-
402/03, Skov v. Bilka Lavprisvarehus, [2006] ECR I-199; for a different approach 
see C-285/08, Leroy Somer, nyr, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 20 
(2009): 501, regarding the award of damages for a professionally used product – 
with the paradoxical result that the protection of private consumers will often be 
weaker than in the case of professional users. 
18  Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-11767. 
19  Case C-346/06, Rüffert, [2008] ECR I-01989. 
20  Compare, for example, European Trade Union Confederation, Resolution: ETUC 
response to ECJ judgments Viking and Laval, available at: <www.etuc.org>. In the 
academic literature, many negative comments have been published on these decisi-
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surprisingly in view of the, at their surface, often merely ‘technical nature’ of 
private law, the ECJ has displayed little sensitivity for the legitimacy 
problématique of the Europeanisation process in that sphere.  
Against the background of this scenario, our plea for a ‘procedural turn’ in 
private law in the European multi-level system has a threefold constructive po-
tential. For one, reconstructing law-generating patterns in the European multi-
level system will, by no means, uncover only disintegrative failures but will 
also unfold the productive and innovative dimensions of the Europeanisation 
process. Second, proceduralisation is, in our view, the proper form of Europe’s 
constitutionalisation – and its only chance: Europeanisation must derive its le-
gitimacy from the normative quality of the processes within which it takes pla-
ce. Last, but not least, the modes of proceduralisation, which we are going to 
develop, have the potential to defend and to develop the social dimension in 
Europe’s private law. 
We are going to develop our argument in the following steps: the first is 
fundamental, in the literal sense; the legal disciplines instructing the Europea-
nisation process assume, each in their own way, that legal systems are organi-
sed nationally; Europe, on the other hand, constitutes a post-national constella-
                                                                                                                                                     
ons in nearly all jurisdiction of “Old Europe’ For a non-exhaustive selection, see B. 
Bercusson, ‘The Trade Union Movement and the EU: Judgment Day’, European 
Law Journal 13 (2007): 279; A. Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?’, In-
dustrial Law Journal 37 (2008): p. 126; P. Chaumette, ‘Les actions collectives syn-
dicales dans le maillage des libertés communautaires des enterprises’, Droit Social 4 
(2008): 210; G. Orlandini, ‘Right to Strike, Transnational Collective Action and Eu-
ropean Law’, Jean Monnet WP Series 08/07; E. Kocher, ‘Die Tariftreueerklärung 
vor dem EuGH’, Der Betrieb 19 (2008): 1042; M. Corti, ‘Le decisioni ITF e Laval 
della Corte di Giustizia’, Rivista Italiana del Diritto di Lavoro I (2008): 254 et seq.; 
R. Eklund, ‘A Swedish Perspective on Laval’, ComparativeLabour Law & Policy 
Journal 29 (2008): 551; F. Bayreuther, ‘Tariftreue vor dem Aus’, Neue Zeitschrift 
für Arbeitsrecht 11 (2008): 626; E. Dockès, ‘L’Europe antisociale’, Revue de Droit 
du Travail, 2009: 11; L. Azoulay, ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market Eco-
nomy: The Emergence of an Ideal and the Conditions for its Realization’, Common 
Market Law Review 45 (2008): 1335; Ch. Joerges & F. Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, 
Formalised Law and the “Social Deficit” of European Integration: Reflections after 
the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, European Law Journal 15 (2009): 
1–19; Ch. Schmid, ‘From effet utile to effet neolibéral: A Critique of the new Me-
thodological Expansionism of the European Court of Justice’, in Conflict of Laws 
and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond - Patterns of Supranational and Trans-
national Juridification, ed. R. Nickel, RECON Report No. 7, Oslo 2009, 421-446 – 
and it does not happen often that the Ministry of a major Member state organises a 
forum for such critique: ‘Symposium on “The Impact of the Case Law of the ECJ 
upon the Labour Law of the Member States’, German Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs, Berlin, 26 June 2008. 
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tion; it is no longer an aggregation of nation states, but a multi-level system. 
This is why it has to develop a legal discipline beyond ‘methodological natio-
nalism’ (Section II). Moreover, the order of the European multi-level system of 
governance cannot copy hierarchical or federal models. Its law must, instead, 
respond to the conflict patters, which are inherent in this sui generis mode of 
governance (Section III). We then examine three different patterns of juridifi-
cation, of Recht-Fertigung (‘justi(ce)-fication’), induced by Europe, to docu-
ment the opportunities and risks entailed by the Europeanisation process (Sec-
tion IV). In the final part, we will further elucidate the normative perspectives 
that can be associated with the procedural paradigm (Section V) and comple-
ment our analyses by an Epilogue on ‘the contest between social justice and 
private law’ in the Europeanisation process. 
II.  The Irresolvable Contest of Legal Disciplines 
‘European law’ has quite firmly established itself as the master discipline of 
the European integration project. ‘Integration through European law’ as con-
ceptualised in the formative period of the European Economic Community is a 
project which pre-supposed specific conditions and was targeted to fairly nar-
rowly-defined objectives. For the understanding of the present difficulties of 
legal integration, it is important to remain aware of this starting point. This is 
equally important with regard to other legal disciplines which European law is 
encountering in its expansionist dynamics. Private international law and com-
parative law deserve particular attention here because these disciplines possess 
an inherent potential to contribute to the establishment of a new European or-
der – and both of them have never abandoned that claim. 
These are good reasons to wonder about the normative grounds upon which 
the victory of European law over its neighbouring disciplines and their compe-
ting perspectives and legal yardsticks may be based. One may even question 
whether the contest between these legal disciplines has come to a definite 
rest.21 To take the example of private law: Is European law best equipped to 
                                                 
21  In a famous treatise first published in 1798, which this section’s heading alludes to, 
Kant referred not only to the sub-disciplines of one faculty. Alluding to Kant’s valu-
ation of philosophy is justified: jurisprudence, much to the contrary of Kant’s deri-
sory remarks, cannot limit itself to a function that serves given authorities, but must 
become productive and make use of what Kant names “reason”. See Ch. Joerges. 
‘The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation Process and as a Contest 
of Disciplines — an Analysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Con-
tracts’, European Review of Private Law 3 (1995): 175. 
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guide the Europeanisation process? Can comparative law claim to be better 
prepared to instruct us about a suitable system of legal rules for Europe? And 
why should not private international law be entitled to teach us how to combi-
ne the construction of a functioning European private law system with the 
respect for national legal traditions? Though these questions are intriguing, we 
will not pass judgement on the capabilities or disabilities of entire legal dis-
ciplines here. 
Our argument is more narrow and is still daring enough. We claim that no-
ne of the three disciplines should win the contest, because none of them is suf-
ficiently equipped to come to terms with the specifics of Europe’s post-
national constellation. All of them have to overcome their inherited ‘methodo-
logical nationalism’,22 i.e., their entanglement in the concepts and methodolo-
gies of presumably sovereign nation states. This allegiance was bound to erode 
in the course of European integration and in the processes of globalisation (de-
territorialisation and de-nationalisation). Europeanisation, we argue, needs to 
be guided by a new post-national discipline. This argument may look more da-
ring than it is meant to be. As our last remarks have indicated, we believe that 
transformation processes are already under way. Our claim is, hence, in more 
modest terms, that it is sufficient to highlight developments that are actually 
taking place, and that all we have to do is acknowledge the emergence of a 
post-national discipline – and to define or to discover suitable legal categories 
and methodologies. 
II.1 European Law 
Our claim that legal science continues - rather stubbornly - to adhere to na-
tional categories of thought must sound surprising, if not strange, in relation to 
the first mentioned discipline, namely, European law. Is not the European con-
struction exactly the negation, the Aufhebung of the nation state? Is not the 
specific characteristic of European law precisely a claim to supranational va-
lidity23 without any need for Europe to become a state first? And could not 
maybe private law, even though it is a ‘latecomer’ to the integration process, 
                                                 
22  M. Zürn, ‘The State in the Post-National Constellation – Societal denationalisation 
and Multi-Level Governance’, ARENA Working Paper No. 35/1999, available at: 
<www.arena.uio.no>. It is not only Zürn who uses the term (see, for example, Beck, 
‘Beyond Methodological Nationalism, Towards a New Critical Theory with a Cos-
mopolitan Intent’, Constellations 10 (2003): 453-467, but I keep to Zürn’s interpre-
tation sketched out in section IV below. 
23  ECR [I963], 24 (Van Gend en Loos). 
 9
become some sort of a test case for transnational non-statal law,24 in particular, 
when it would require no more of private law than to revise its own traditions? 
European constitutionalism is, indeed, deeply involved in pertinent efforts. 
Suffice it here to point to two prominent examples from Germany. The former 
constitutional judge Dieter Grimm, by no means a Euro-sceptic, continues to 
object to the use of the term ‘constitution’ for the European polity.25 His 
brethren from the German Constitutional Court delivered, in their recent judg-
ment on the Treaty of Lisbon, a more drastic confirmation of this negative fi-
xation: Germany must not participate in a federal entity; it has to safeguard its 
constitutional identity.26 In the context of private law, the debate on the code 
provides the most telling example. The most ardent academic advocate of a 
European code, namely, Christian von Bar,27 more than others emphasises that 
legislation should draw on the authority of science and scholarly deliberation, 
rather than politics. His views quite accurately reflect the self-understanding of 
Germany’s Pandectists of the Nineteenth century.28 The German Civil Code 
did, then, at the turn of the last century, symbolise the emergence of a German 
nation state. It seems politically highly unlikely that a European Civil Code 
could play a similar part. Though the project of a European Civil Code has had 
                                                 
24  See N. Jansen & R. Michaels, ‘Private Law and the State, Comparative Perception 
and Historical Observation’, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationa-
les Privatrecht 71 (2007): 345; Gralf-Peter Calliess, ‘Transnationales Verbraucher-
vertragsrecht’, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 
68 (2004): 244. 
25  D. Grimm, ‘Integration by Constitution?’, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 3 (2005): 193; idem, ‘The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization’, 
(2005) 12 Constellations, 447. 
26  Bundesverfassungsgericht, file no.: 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 
1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 und 2 BvR 182/09; see comments in German Law Journal 
10:8 (2009), available at: www.germanlawjournal.com; A. Fischer-Lescano, Ch. 
Joerges & A. Wonka (eds), ‘The German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Ruling: Le-
gal and Political Science Perspectives’, ZERP WP 1/2010. available at   
<www.zerp.uni-bremen.de>. 
27  See Ch. von Bar, ‘From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European Private 
Law’, Columbia Journal of European Law 9 (2002): 379. 
28  See, poignantly, H.H. Jakobs, Wissenschaft und Gesetzgebung im bürgerlichen Recht 
nach der Rechts- quellenlehre des 19, Jahrhunderts, (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1983), 
160: Tthe German Civil Code is ‘… a code of law, the sources of which can be found 
not in itself, but in the legal science that has created it; a code of law seeking to be 
dominated by, rather than to dominate, science...’. (our translation); see, for closer ana-
lysis, Ch. Joerges, ‘Die Überarbeitung des BGB-Schuldrechts, die Sonderprivatrechte 
und die Unbestimmtheit des Rechts’, Kritische Justiz 20 (1987): 166. 
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a mobilising effect throughout legal science,29 it seems also inconceivable that 
Europe’s democratic societies would tolerate the rule of ‘Professorenrecht’.30 
On the other hand, even a ‘hard code’ which would prescribe a welfarist model 
of private law31 is simply illusionary. The Commission has, up until now, care-
fully avoided taking a definitive position by promoting the chameleon of the 
Common Framework of Reference – and thereby implicitly confirmed the need 
for a third way.32 Indeed, it has become by now evident that a European code, 
if desirable at all, could not simply replicate its Nineteenth and Twentieth cen-
tury national predecessors, but would need to be adapted to the particular fea-
tures of the European multi-level system.33 
II.2  Comparative Law 
‘Im Westen nichts Neues’ – by this allusion to Erich Maria Remarque’s famous 
novel, Ralf Michaels has characterised the proceedings of the World Congress 
of Comparative Law in 2000.34 Since then we have been witnessing a true ren-
aissance of comparative law.35 For long decades it was – in Germany and 
elsewhere – virtually self-evident that comparative research would focus on 
                                                 
29  See K. Riedl, Vereinheitlichung des Privatrechts in Europa, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2004). 
30  H. Schepel, ‘Professorenrecht? The Field of European Private Law’, in P.A.J. van 
den Berg, Lawyer’s Circles – Lawyers and European Legal Integration, ed. P.A.J. 
van den Berg, (The Hague: Elsevier Reed, 2004), 115-124; see infra section III.3. 
31  U. Mattei, ‘Hard Code Now!’, Global Jurist Frontiers 1 (2002), Article 1. 
32  Interestingly, new commissioner Viviane Reding, apparently not irritated by previous 
controversies, has used very clear language. In her answer to a question from the Eu-
ropean parliament she ‘flagged’ with the highest priority the project of moving ‘from 
the first building blocks of European contract law (common frame of reference, stan-
dard terms and conditions, consumer rights) to a European Civil Code’, albeit one 
‘which could take the form either of a voluntary tool to improve coherence, or of an 
optional 28th contract law regime or of a more ambitious project’. However, it is too 
early to say whether this speech marks a definitive shift in the Commission’s position 
in favour of a code (full text available at:   
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/static/commissioners/answers/reding_replies
_en.pdf>). 
33  See, in this perspective, H. Collins, The European Civil Code. The Way Forward, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
34  R. Michaels, ‘Im Westen Nichts Neues’, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und 
internationals Privatrecht 66 (2002): 97. 
35  See, for example, A. Engelbrekt, J. Nergelius & E. Elgar, New Directions in Compa-
rative Law, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing,, 2010), 185, at 194 et seq.). 
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American law, and only on American law. In the meantime, the Common core 
project alone attracts, year after year, a growing number of comparative law-
yers from all over Europe and the rest of the world to Trento.36 Comparative 
law casebooks are available.37 European universities have extended their intra-
European comparative research with some enthusiasm, provoking not only 
quantitative, but also qualitative, improvements – a real renaissance. 
Again, it would be adventurous to try to force what has become a rich and 
diverse theoretical debate into a uniform agenda. And just as is the case for 
European law, the claim that comparative law is pervaded by methodological 
nationalism may alienate the reader at first. But it holds true, in our view, as 
shall be demonstrated by turning to the views of two important exponents and 
opponents. Reinhard Zimmermann, on the one hand, reveals, in his numerous 
works, that the common European legal heritage, the ius commune europaeum 
continues to have a considerable impact on continental civil law systems and 
throughout the English (but not the American) common law. He seems to be 
sketching out the foundations of a position in favour of transnational and non-
state private law.38 But, in his theoretical approach, Zimmermann combines 
historical studies and practical work on law. His writings on legal history are 
meant to provide support to non-legislative codification movements. It comes 
as no surprise that the title of the first section of the Introduction to the Histo-
ric-critical Commentary on the German Civil Code reads: ‘The European Co-
dification Movement’.39 The section then ensures us that: 
‘the codifications have not rendered learned jurists redundant, nor have they 
led to a permanent consolidation (or fossilisation) of private law. But they did 
                                                 
36  Bussani & Mattei (eds), The Common Core of European Private Law, Essays on the 
Project, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2002); on this and with a 
further impressive summary of the discipline’s status quo, Gambaro, ‘The Trento 
Theses’, Global Jurist 4 (2004), No. 1, Article 2. 
37  Ch. von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, vol. l, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press,1998); W. van Gerven et al., Tort Law and Scope of Protection: Cases, Mate-
rials and Text, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998). Further volumes in the Ius Commu-
ne casebook series include: W. van Gerven, P. Larouche & J. Lever, Tort Law, (Ox-
ford: Hart Publishing, 2000); H. Beale, et al., (eds), Contract Law, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2002); J. Beatson & E.J.H. Schrage (eds), Unjustified Enrichment, (Ox-
ford: Hart Publishing, 2003); D Schiek, L Waddington & M Bell (eds), Non-
Discrimination Law, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007). 
38  See R. Zimmermann, ‘Heard Melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter ...’, 
Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 193 (1993): 122; idem, ‘Roman Law and Europe-
an Legal Unity’, in this volume. 
39  R. Zimmermann, Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 
(Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 2003) paras. 1 et seq. before § 1. 
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facilitate, on the one hand, national fragmentation of legal traditions … on the 
other, the codifications ended the “second life” of Roman law, the history of its 
direct practical application…’40 
The Europeanisation of private law cannot and should not rewind the clock of 
history. But historical legal scholarship is trying to feed into it an awareness of 
its pan-European foundations – to boost the European codification project, 
which would create and symbolise a uniform European legal space. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum of comparative contributions is Pierre 
Legrand.41 His non-convergence thesis, his rigid opposition to functionalism in 
comparative law and to codification movements is based upon the assertion 
that common law and civil law cannot communicate because the law is a cultu-
ral phenomenon and European legal cultures have developed, quite simply, in 
an incompatible way. Both Zimmermann and Legrand loosen ties between law 
and the nation state. Yet, both remain, themselves, tied to a methodological 
nationalism: Zimmermann in that he seeks to follow the example of historical 
legal science in the codification movement; Legrand in that he deduces from 
the cultural features of common law and civil law their political autonomy.42 
The Gretchen question, to which these and so many other contributions ha-
ve to respond, concerns the guidance which comparative studies can provide in 
Europe’s search for the private law of the Europeanisation process. In the 
neighbouring globalisation problématique, comparativists tend towards the 
privatisation option: law can best serve the legal needs of transnational markets 
through the dissolutions of its links with state orders.43 Within the European 
                                                 
40  Our translation. 
41  Poignantly, for example: ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging’, Internatio-
nal and Comparative Law Quarterly 45 (1996): 52; ‘Against a European Civil Co-
de’, Modern Law Review 60 (1997): 44; idem, ‘Antivonbar’ Journal of Comparative 
Law 1 (2006): 13. 
42  These are no more than cursory remarks. Hein Kötz, representing the leading – func-
tionalist – school of comparative law, has always been sceptical towards the idea of 
codification; see his Gemeineuropäisches Zivilrecht, Festschrift Konrad Zweigert, 
(Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1981), 481-500; methodologically strict exponents of the 
common core project are agnostic in terms of legal policy: for example, Bussani, i-
bid., (note 17 supra), but also U. Mattei, ‘Hard Code Now!’, Global Jurist Fron-
tiers, 2, No. 1 (2002), Article 1. The Gretchen question, however, remains whether 
comparative law can give up its perception of autonomous legal systems. How can 
we conceptualise their inter-dependencies and the emergence of multi-level systems 
with interconnected competences? 
43  See N. Jansen & R. Michaels (note 24 supra); G.-P. Calliess, ‘Transnationales 
Verbrauchervertragsrecht’ (note 24 supra); critiques: Ch. Möllers, ‘Transnational 
Governance without Public Law?’, in Transnational Governance and Constitutiona-
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Union, this option cannot be pursued rigidly. What comparative studies reveal, 
instead, are obstacles to legal ‘unification from above’: the disintegrative side 
effects of integration, the simultaneity of convergence and divergence,44 and 
the operation of transplants as ‘legal irritants’.45 Such findings confirm the 
need for a new discipline, which we are advocating. 
II.3  Private International Law 
The response to legal diversity through a transformation of inter-jurisdictional 
relations into a ‘lawful condition’ (Rechtszustand46) is the grandiose objective 
of private international law, which one can, for precisely this reason, under-
stand as the master among all legal disciplines with transnational ambitions. 
However, even private international law carries with it the legacy of methodo-
logical nationalism. This is apparent not only from the origin of its rules in na-
tional legal systems, but also holds true with regard to its prevailing conceptual 
                                                                                                                                                     
lism, ed. Ch. Joerges & I.-J. Sand & G. Teubner, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 
329-338; K. Günther, ‘Kann das Zivilrecht im Zuge der Globalisierung das öffentli-
che Recht ersetzen?’ in Ch. Joerges & G. Teubner (eds), Rechtverfassungsrecht, 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos,2003), 295-311; Ch. Joerges & O. Gerstenberg, Private go-
vernance, democratic constitutionalism and supranationalism, Luxembourg: Euro-
pean Commission (Directorate-General Science, Research and Development; EUR 
18340 EN) 1998. F. Rödl, ‘Private Law Beyond the Democratic Order? On the Legi-
timatory Problem of Private Law “Beyond the State”’, American Journal of Compa-
rative Law 56 (2008): 743. 
44  See G. Brüggemeier & Ch. Joerges, ‘Europäisierung des Vertrags- und Haftungs-
rechts“, in Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, ed. P.-Ch. 
Müller-Graff (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2nd. ed. 1999), 301-360; H. Muir Watt, ‘Glo-
balization and Comparative Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law ed. 
M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 579 et 
seq., at 586-588; J. Friedman, ‘Being in the World: Globalisation and Localisation’, 
Theory Culture & Society 7 (1990): 311-328. 
45  G. Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law Or How Unifying Law Ends 
Up in New Differences’, Modern Law Review 61 (1998): 11. 
46  I. Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch’, (1796), in idem., Political Wri-
tings, (H. Reiss, ed), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 93-130: for 
an explanation, see J. Habermas, ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred 
Years’ Historical Remove’, in: idem., Inclusion of the Other: Inclusion Studies in 
Political Theory, ed. by C. Cronin & P. de Greiff (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2002), 165-202. 
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orientations.47 
European and Private International Law (PIL) lived separate lives for a long 
time, encouraged by a culture of non-communication, in which European la-
wyers defined themselves as public law while PIL resorted to private law. 
Thus, for a long time, it went practically unnoticed that the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) adjudicated constellations that had already been thoroughly 
thought through by PIL. Nowhere did overlaps receive greater attention or we-
re discussed earlier than in Germany. Several stages and strands in pertinent 
discussions can be distinguished: a first phase, was when PIL was recommen-
ded as a soft alternative to harmonisation.48 This was clearly an unrealistic per-
spective. However, the new competences in the Treaty of Amsterdam (old Ar-
ticle 65, new Article 81) have paved the way for a new complementary relati-
onship. A second one, still ongoing,49 is one in which European law – in parti-
cular, the fundamental freedoms and the non-discrimination principle, and the 
mutual recognition jurisprudence – were invoked to correct traditional PIL ru-
les.50 Our contribution advocates a third vision, which we will develop step by 
step in the following sections.51 
                                                 
47  See the poignant analysis in F. Rödl, ‘Weltbürgerliches Kollisionsrecht. Über die 
Form des Kollisionsrechts und seine Gestalt im Recht der Europäischen Union’, 
Ph.D Thesis EUI Florence 2008, part 1 B.II. 
48  See, for example, K. Kreuzer, ‘Die Europäisierung des internationalen Privatrechts – 
Vorgaben des Gemeinschaftsrechts’, in Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, ed. Müller-Graff, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2nd ed.1993), 301-360. 
49  See the example of company law, discussed in Section IV.2 infra. 
50  See J. Basedow, ‘Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europäi-
schen Binnenmarkt’, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Pri-
vatrecht 59 (1995): 1; summary and analysis of current developments in Ch. Schmid 
(note* supra), especially in part 3, section 1, sub-section 1. 
51  As the readers of this volume will realise, there are more, and in interesting ways, 
overlapping efforts to adapt conflict of laws to the exigencies of Europe’s integra-
ting market. See, in particular, H. Muir Watt, ‘The Challenge of Market Integration 
for European Conflicts Theory’, 191-204; see, also, eadem, ‘Integration and Diversi-
ty: The Conflict of Laws as a Regulatory Tool’, in The Institutional Framework of 
EPL, ed. F. Cafaggi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 107-148.; we concur 
in the rejection of the traditional public/private divide in conflict of laws (or PIL 
respectively). We are not in agreement with regard to “the Political” in European 
conflicts, where Muir Watt places much confidence in the rationality of regulatory 
competition; for our view, see the discussion of company law in Section IV.2 infra. 
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III.  The Misery of Methodological Nationalism and the Need 
for a Reconceptualisation of Europe’s Postnational  
Constellation 
Our observations so far were concerned primarily with the discrepancies be-
tween Europe’s post-national constellation and the nation state legacy of three 
legal disciplines. What may be perceived as a primarily conceptual and doc-
trinal exercise has, however, serious and challenging theoretical and political 
implications. These are threefold: (1) We need to reconsider and replace the 
analytical framework upon which we, mainly only implicitly, build our legal 
conceptualisations – in this regard we will plead for an explicit turn to the ana-
lytics of multi-level governance. (2) As lawyers, we must not treat analytical 
categories developed by social scientists as valid normative yardsticks. For our 
understanding of the legal and normative challenges of the European constella-
tion, the multi-level governance analytics is but a heuristic device and starting 
point in our search for sociologically adequate legal categories. (3) Last, but 
not least, we have - as students of private law in the EU - to specify these in-
sights with a view to situating the societal functions and normative vocation of 
private law in the Europeanisation process. This is the most demanding of the 
three challenges for those who seek to preserve the democratic legacy of the 
private law systems of constitutional democracies and the promises of social 
justice which democracy entails. 
III.1  Multi-level Governance as Analytical Paradigm in European  
Studies 
It has become somehow fashionable in legal quarters to resort to political sci-
ence in legal analyses of the state of the European Union. This opening of the 
legal world is, to a considerable degree, the result of the ‘turn to governance’ 
in European politics52 - and it has a strong fundamentum in re. Decades ago, 
William Wallace famously realised and explained: Europe is ‘Less than a Fed-
                                                 
52  Suffice it here to mention the Commission White Paper – COM(428) final of 
25.07.2001 – the CONNEX project in Mannheim and the New Gov project at the 
EUI Florence – both enormously prolific. 
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eration, More than a Regime’.53 What is it instead? Lisbeth Hooghe and Gary 
Marks pioneered the efforts to define positively the Union’s position between 
the two poles by the notion of ‘multi-level governance sui generis’.54 The fur-
ther efforts to clarify the somewhat obfuscating sui generis description need 
not concern us here in any detail.55 Political theorists with normative aspira-
tions have underlined the ambivalences of the turn to governance; and meth-
odologically sensitive lawyers realise that multi-level governance constitutes a 
challenge, rather than an accomplishment, if it is contrasted with the concept of 
democracy as institutionalised in constitutional nation states. This challenge 
will be discussed in the remainder of this essay. What should be apparent, 
however, is the need to embark upon new and unchartered seas. Michael Zürn 
has characterised this situation drastically, but adequately, in diagnosing a 
‘misery of methodological nationalism’.56 His diagnosis is so valuable because 
it rests upon robust descriptions of the irreversible transformations of the con-
texts of policy-making in the European and extra-European post-national con-
stellation. The nation state is no longer in a position to define its political pri-
orities autonomously (as a ‘sovereign’), but is, instead, forced to co-ordinate 
them transnationally. Not only must states and national citizens recognise such 
external constraints. They have also become accountable to transnational bod-
ies in which their politics are subjected to evaluation. To be sure, national gov-
ernments vehemently continue to defend their fiscal powers. ‘Whilst resources 
remain (in?/for the most part) at national level, the formulation of politics has 
been internationalised and recognition transnationalized’.57 
                                                 
53  W. Wallace, ‘Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a 
Political System’, in Policy-Making in the European Community, ed. H. Wallace & 
W. Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 403-436. 
54  G. Marks, L. Hooghe & K. Blank, ‘European Integration since the 1980s: State-
Centric versus Multi-Level Governance’, Journal of Common Market Studies 34 
(1996): 343. 
55  See, instructively, B. Kohler-Koch & B. Rittberger, ‘Review Article: The “Gover-
nance Turn” in EU Studies’, Journal of Common Market Studies. Annual Review 44 
(2006): 27. L. Hooghe & G. Marks continue to contribute importantly. See, recently, 
‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to 
Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of Political Science 39 (2008): 1. 
56  Note 7 supra. 
57  Ibid., 188. 
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III.2  A New Conflicts Law as Response to the Misery of  
Methodological Nationalism 
The assertion that the inherited legal categories in all of our ‘international’ 
sub-disciplines mirror the legacy of the nation state is anything but exciting. 
Equally, it should not come as a surprise that legal science – in constitutional 
and administrative as well as private law – draws on national and federal ex-
amples in its efforts to come to terms with the European as well as the extra-
European post-national constellation. Re-orientations are inevitable – and un-
der way in all pertinent disciplines. We have, of course, to refrain from survey-
ing these developments and to content ourselves, instead, with submitting our 
own position, namely, the idea of a new type of conflicts law as a/the legal 
paradigm of the European constellation. 
A new type of conflicts law, so we assert, is needed simply because the 
multi-level system of the European Union is characterised by a variety of 
conflict constellations which contrast markedly with the sociological premises 
of our legal heritage. This suggestion may continue to sound somewhat idio-
syncratic, but it has, by now, attracted some benevolent attention, not least out-
side legal science. Our approach  
‘distinguishes between vertical, horizontal, and diagonal legal conflicts in the 
EU, i.e., conflicts about which legal norms apply to a given case. These three 
types of legal conflict can be applied to MLG generally. Vertical conflicts are 
conflicts between legal regimes at different territorial levels; they occur both 
between national law and EU legislation, and between EU law and WTO rules. 
In horizontal conflicts, which represent the traditional PIL setting, the injuncti-
ons of different national laws to a given case diverge. Horizontal legal conflicts 
occur typically in the context of transactions involving the movement of persons, 
goods, or finances across national borders. Diagonal legal conflicts finally oc-
cur if regimes at two different levels that apply to different aspects of a given 
case make contradictory demands’58  
This is but the conceptual starting point. The conflicts law approach needs to 
be substantiated and differentiated.59 However, in the present context, we are 
                                                 
58  R. Mayntz, ‘The Architecture of Multi-level Governance of Economic Sectors’, 
(Cologne: MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/13), 23-24 (with references). 
59  See, Ch. Joerges, ‘Integration through Conflicts Law: On the Defence of the European 
Project by means of Alternative Conceptualisation of Legal Constitutionalisation’, in 
Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond - Patterns of Supranati-
onal and Transnational Juridification, ed. R. Nickel, RECON Report No. 7, Oslo 
2009, 631-660) and ‘A New Type of Conflicts Law as the Legal Paradigm of the Post-
national Constellation’, in The Social Embeddedness of Transnational Markets, ed. 
Ch. Joerges & J. Falke (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). – P. Kjaer uses the same ter-
minology, but seems to envisage 4 dimensions – and, as a social scientist, is not con-
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exclusively concerned with private law proper. 
III.3  Democracy and Private Law in the European Union 
The challenge of this focus is that modern private law has undergone funda-
mental changes within its harbouring national orders. These changes have af-
fected both its social objectives and its (‘regulatory’) functions. They have also 
affected its normative foundations. The private law systems of constitutional 
democracies have become ‘socially embedded’ in the welfare fabric of national 
societies and their normative quality is inextricably linked with the institutions 
and the law-generating processes of democratic constitutionalism. We cannot – 
and need not60 – reconstruct these transformations here. It is important, how-
ever, in view of the many contrasting views, to underline that, in our under-
standing, private law is not an autonomous sub-system governed by some one-
dimensional economic rational, but a dimension of democratic governance. We 
are indebted in this understanding to Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of law 
and democracy in general, and to his co-originality thesis in particular.61 
Habermas has, in his magnum opus on legal theory, distanced himself from all 
equations of the normativity of private law with some given economic ordo, on 
the one hand, and the autonomy assigned to the economic system in Niklas 
Luhmann’s systems theory, on the other.62 The co-originality theorem seeks to 
overcome the age-old schism between the private autonomy of citizens in the 
economic sphere and their rights to political participation; thus, it reconciles 
private and public autonomy.63 With this move, private autonomy obtained a 
                                                                                                                                                     
cerned with a new juridifcation strategy; see his ‘Integration/Disintegration als Code 
des Europäischen Verfassungswandels`, in Europäaische Gesellschaftsverfassung, ed. 
A. Fischer-Lescano et al., (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 395-404, at 403 and in more 
detail idem, ‘Three-dimensional Conflict of Laws in Europe’, ZERP-DP 2/2009. 
60  See Ch. Joerges, ‘The Science of Private Law and the Nation-State’, in The Euro-
peanization of Law. The Legal Effects of European Integration, ed. F. Snyder (Ox-
ford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 47-82. 
61  As developed in Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy, translated by W. Rehg, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1996), 
118 et seq., (at 122). Lucid reconstruction: R. Nickel, ‘Private and Public Autonomy 
Revisited: Habermas’ Concept of Co-Originality in Times of Globalization and the 
Militant Security State’, in The Paradox of Constitutionalism, ed. M Loughlin & N. 
Walker, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
62  N. Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1988). 
63  J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, note 61 supra, at 118 et seq., (at 122); see 
also the lucid reconstruction by R Nickel, ‘Private and Public Autonomy Revisited: 
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new constitutional dignity. At the same time, it became embedded in democ-
ratic processes. ‘Co-originality’ is realised through the application of the dis-
course principle to ‘the general right to liberties … and ends by legally institu-
tionalizing the conditions for a discursive exercise of political autonomy’.64 
Hence, the legitimacy of law depends on: 
‘undistorted forms of public communication and indirectly on the communicati-
onal infrastructure of the private sphere as well. This is the key to a procedura-
list understanding of law.’65 
It should be readily apparent why Europeanisation processes constitute chal-
lenges to the normative quality which private law has established in constitu-
tional democracies. We have conceptualised this challenge earlier as a conflict 
between the functional logic of market integration and the normative logic of 
law generation in democracies.66 The/This challenge - we would substantiate 
this formula now - is twofold: for one/, Europeanisation tends to decouple pri-
vate law from its regulatory environment. This decoupling and disintegrating 
move has then to be compensated by re-regulatory activities at European level. 
Furthermore, Europeanisation tends to weaken the embeddedness of law-
production in social and political environments The first dimension is difficult 
enough. The democratic challenge, however, seems even more difficult to 
meet. We suggest that the conflicts approach provides promising prospects, 
although we by no means claim that it provides/furnishes ready-made answers. 
We will, in the following sections, proceed first inductively with a few case 
studies and then generalise our findings. 
IV. Exempla Trahunt: Three Patterns of Europeanisation of 
Private Law 
‘Less than a “system”, but more than just an ensemble of contingent case law’ 
– thus, the claim of the following analyses of the praxis of Europeanisation in 
private law by which we seek a third way between continental, in particular, 
                                                                                                                                                     
Habermas’ Concept of Co-originality in Times of Globalization and the Militant Se-
curity State’ in M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutiona-
lism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Reform (Oxford: OUP, 2006). 
64  Ibid., p. 121. 
65  Ibid., p. 409. 
66  Ch. Joerges & G. Brüggemeier, ‘Europäisierung des Vertragsrechts und Haftungs-
rechts’, in Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, ed. P.-Ch. 
Müller-Graff, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2nd ed. 1999), 301-360. 
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German, traditions and the agnosticism of legal realism. Hence, we do not ex-
pect that controversies and litigation will generate thanks to some invisible 
hand or the stringency of the legal argumentation of some doctrinally coherent 
‘system’; though remarkable, efforts undertaking such reconstructions67 cannot 
deliver much more than a/a form of heuristic. But this is not to say that we 
have to content ourselves with breaking the law down into a string or panopti-
cum of individual cases. We submit that both the constructions of systems and 
the assemblage of decisional events can be replaced by the reconstruction of 
law generating patterns in the European polity. The plural in this suggestion is 
important: We have to be aware of the specifics of both conflict constellations 
and of the strategies of institutional and non-governmental actors, and of the 
specifics of European policy processes and European law. We should ac-
knowledge that the European political system is not ruled by some suprana-
tional political authority with a kompetenz-kompetenz, and that, although the 
law provides an ersatz for such an authority, it will have to operate as the ser-
vant of many masters with competing of conflicting orientations. This is why 
we should not assume that the moves and the counter-moves in the processes 
of European law production will generate some uniform orientation and oscil-
late around some hidden equilibrium – but that they will, in their evaluation, 
focus on the normative quality of these processes. 
Three sets of examples are being introduced, which exemplify, in turn, so-
me significant patterns of Europeanisation of private law. Their ‘exemplarity’ 
is especially manifested in the range of options which they uncover for integra-
tion policy. In saying this, we implicitly suggest that these options include di-
verse, even opposite, perspectives which reflect with colliding concepts of Eu-
ropeanisation. We also assert that their contest will not come to a rest, and that 
we should not expect any one pattern to acclaim a monopoly at any time in the 
future. Instead, each will individually be subjected to a range of experiences 
which will, in turn, provoke further learning processes. 
IV.1  Product Liability Law: On the Decoupling of Consumer  
Protection from Its Social Fabric and Objectives 
Consumer protection was the gateway for?/of the European Community for/to? 
the realm of private law.[consider saxon genitive: was the European Commu-
nity’s gateway into the realm… This was a very fortunate beginning, because 
the Community pioneered the overdue reform of national legal systems – and 
                                                 
67  See K. Riesenhuber, System und Prinzipien des Europäischen Vertragsrechts, (Ber-
lin: de Gruyter, 2003). 
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met with very active support from true academic entrepreneurs.68 Since then, 
the consumer problématique has attracted ever-growing attention. The inher-
ited labelling of ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels of consumer protection is not outdated, 
but it does not capture the ambivalent blessings of ‘high levels of consump-
tion’ at ‘low prices’. This has led to dilemmas. While it has become apparent 
that ‘the legal construction of the consumer’69 has to reflect new challenges 
which are discussed at highly sophisticated levels in economic sociology, po-
litical science and/as well as in historical reconstructions, which all observe the 
gradual transformation of the consumer as market agent into a political citi-
zen,70 the European Commission has turned its back on its once pioneering ini-
tiatives. With ever growing intensity, consumer protection is conceptualised as 
a market integration device of a one-dimensional and simplistic economic ra-
tionality.71 This widely-noticed paradigmatic shift has damaged the alliance 
between the Commission and the academic community of consumer lawyers.72 
The partly realised and more generally envisaged replacement of the politics of 
minimum harmonisation, which left much political autonomy to the Member 
States by/with/through the strategy of ‘full harmonisation’ which seeks to pre-
empt national alternatives to European regimes may turn into a pyrrhic victory. 
The strategy is at odds with the socio-economic diversity persisting, and even 
deepening, in Europe/which persists, and is even deepening, in Europe. In 
                                                 
68  See, as chief publications, N. Reich & H.-W. Micklitz, Consumer Legislation in the 
EC Countries. A Comparative Analysis, (New York et al.: Van Nosatrand Reinhold, 
1980); Europäisches Verbraucherrecht, 4th ed. 2003; D.M. Trubek & Th. Bour-
gognie, Consumer Law, Common Markets and Federalism in Europe and the United 
States, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986). 
69  M. Everson, ‘Legal Construction of the Consumer’, in The Making of the Consumer, 
ed. F. Trentmann, (Oxford-New York: Berg Publishers, 2006), 99-124; eadem, ‘Eu-
ropean Citizenship and the Disillusion of the Common Man’, in Conflict of Laws 
and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond - Patterns of Supranational and Trans-
national Juridification, ed. R. Nickel, RECON Report No. 7, Oslo 2009, 165-188. 
70  N. Stehr, C. Henning & B. Weiler (eds), The Moralization of the Market, (Transac-
tion Publishers, New Jersey, 2006); M. Bevir & F. Trentmann (eds). Governance, 
consumers and citizens. Agency and resistance in contemporary politics, (Ba-
singstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
71  See, for example, Ch. Schmid, ‘The Instrumentalist Conception of the Acquis 
Communautaire in Consumer Law and its Implications on a European Contract Law 
Code’, European Review of Contract Law 1 (2005): 211. 
72  H.-W. Micklitz & N. Reich, ‘Crónica de una muerte anunciada: The Commission 
Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’, Common Market Law Review 46 
(2009): 471; H.-W. Micklitz, ‘The targeted full harmonisation approach: Looking 
behind the veil’, in Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law, ed. G. 
Howells & R. Schulze, (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2009). 
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view of this diversity, the imposition of uniform rules on the balancing of mar-
ket development and consumer demand do not make economic sense. They 
also risk the destruction of/destroying the social fabric of markets and con-
sumption which remains, even after globalisation and Europeanisation in im-
portant respects characterised by national contexts: European consumer protec-
tion which started out as a mechanism promoting the social embeddedness of 
transnational markets is being turned into a disembedding exercise.73 
Our discussion here focuses on one, albeit particularly spectacular example, 
namely. the product liability jurisprudence of the ECJ. This jurisprudence con-
cerns the Product Liability Directive, once unanimously adopted under (the 
old) Article 100 EEC Treaty, on 25 July 1985.74 The, then, governing unanimi-
ty rule explains why the directive regulates product liability law so incomplete-
ly,75 and why it was bound to disappoint consumer advocates who had hoped 
for a flagship/that it would be the flagship of European consumer protection 
law.76 The Directive was widely considered a marginal piece of legislation 
with little impact on the general tort law, particularly since Article 13 of the 
Directive did not, apparently, preclude concurring claims pursuant to other le-
gal bases.77 There was, at any rate, broad agreement that the Directive would 
not preclude further advances in consumer protection at national level because 
it was understood as prescribing only a set of conclusive minimum standards. 
For a long time, these expectations appeared justifiable – until, starting with 
three judgments handed down on 25 April 2002,78 the ECJ shattered them qui-
te dramatically. In a formalistic reasoning, the Court recognised, to the great 
                                                 
73  It is worth noting that a much better alternatives are conceivable under the Treaty of 
Lisbon: Art 12 (ex-Art 153(2) TEC) provides that ‘Consumer protection require-
ments shall be taken into account in defining and implementing other Union policies 
and activities’ This is but a general clause, albeit one which would sustain, if not re-
quire, more sophisticated responses to the multi-faceted consumption problématique 
in contemporary societies. 
74  OJ L 2l0/1985. 29. 
75  H. Koch, ‘Internationale Produkthaftung und Grenzen der Rechtsangleichung durch 
die EG-Richtlinie’, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 152 
(1988): 537. 
76   See G. Brüggemeier & N Reich, ‘Die EG-Produkthaftungs-Richtlinie 1985 und ihr 
Verhältnis zur Produzentenhaftung nach § 823 Abs. 1 BGB’, Wertpapier Mitteilun-
genm 1986, 149. 
77  See G. Brüggemeier, ‘Produkthaftung und Produktsicherheit’, Zeitschrift für das 
gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 152 (1988): 511.. 
78  Case C-52/00, [2002] ECR I-3827 Commission v. France; Case C-183/00, [2002] 
ECR I·3901; MarÍa/Maria Victoria González Sánchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA; 
Case C- 154/00, [2002] ECR I-3879 Commission v. Greece. 
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surprise of most observers, that the Directive’s consumer protection provisions 
were not intended to introduce protective minimum standards, but to achieve 
‘full harmonisation’, instead. 
The three decisions just mentioned concerned the French, the Greek and the 
Spanish implementation of the Directive. The Spanish case is particularly 
frightening.79 Mrs. Gonzalez Sanchez had to have a blood transfusion in the 
hospital run by the defendant institution (Medicinal Austrian SA). As a conse-
quence of the transfusion, she was infected with the Hepatitis C virus. She ba-
sed her action upon the Statute by which Spain had transposed the Directive 
into Spanish law, and, in addition, on the general liability provisions of Spa-
nish civil law, and on the Spanish General Law for the Protection of Consu-
mers and Users of 19 July 1984, under which the claimant had only to prove 
damage and causality. Under the Product Liability Directive, however, which 
was implemented in Spain 10 years after the 1984 Act,80 she also had to prove 
that the hospital had produced the blood conserves, which she failed to show. 
Therefore, the success of her claim depended on the relationship between the 
three legal bases. Article 13 of the Directive provides that the Directive: 
‘shall not affect any rights which an injured person may have according to the 
rules of the law of contractual or non-contractual liability or a special liability 
system existing at the moment when this Directive is notified.’ 
Does this mean, the Spanish court asked the ECJ, that the Directive could ‘be 
interpreted as precluding the restriction or limitation, as a result of transposi-
tion of the Directive, of rights granted to consumers under the legislation of the 
Member State’?81 To the unversed reader, the question may sound rhetorical. 
But the Court responded: 
‘[...Article 13 of the Directive cannot be interpreted as giving the Member Sta-
tes the possibility of maintaining a general system of product liability different 
from that provided for in the Directive.’82 
The provision that Article 13 does not affect claims on a different basis cannot 
                                                 
79  On the following, see analyses by G. Viney, ‘L’Interprétation par la CJCE de la Di-
rective du 25 Juillet 1985 sur la Responsabilité du Fait des Produits Défectueux’, La 
Semaine Juridique, 2002, I 177, 1945; J. Calais-Auloy, ‘Menace européenne sur la 
jurisprudence francaise concernant l’obligation de sécurité du vendeur profession-
nel’, Recueil Le Dalloz 2002, No. 31, 1458; B. Koch, ‘Nationales Deliktsrecht vor 
dem EuGH – Irrungen und Wirrungen’ in G. Roth & P. Hilpold (eds), Der EuGH 
und die Souveränität der Mitgliedstaaten (Vienna: Linde, 2008); for more details, 
see Ch. Schmid (note* supra), especially part 2, section 4, chapter 5. 
80  Case C-183/00 para. 7, 8. 
81  Ibid., para. 13. 
82  Ibid.. para. 30. 
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‘be relied on in such a case in order to justify the maintenance in force of na-
tional provisions affording greater protection than those of the Directive’.83 
In its analysis of the Community law provisions, the ECJ referred to Recital 
1 of the Directive, according to which ‘approximation is necessary because 
legislative divergences may distort competition and affect the movement of 
goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of protection of 
the consumer against damage caused by a defective product to his health or 
property’.84 It had been necessary at the time to introduce this sentence, in or-
der to ‘establish’ the Community’s (functional) legislative competence. Since 
then, the paragraph has become neither more empirically relevant, nor norma-
tively more correct. Nevertheless, the Court’s judgment re-affirmed its value as 
a virtually teleological motivation for restricting the legislative autonomy of 
the Member States.85 
European law, understood in this way, does not contribute much to the Eu-
ropeanisation process. The preliminary rulings procedure has good institutional 
sense because it links the judiciary in Member States to the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ. But it can bear painful consequences for those who seek justice in a case 
that would not normally seem problematical.86 After long years of litigation, 
Mrs. Sanchez finally knew whom she would have had to sue in order to enfor-
ce her rights. A result such as this one would be easier to accept if we could 
read into the ECJ’s judgment a constructive contribution to future develop-
ments in product liability law. This is hardly possible. The irony and tragedy of 
this development has already been underlined.87 
The cited cases are spectacular, but, unfortunately, not exceptional. ‘Full 
harmonisation’ has become a strong credo in subsequent cases such as Skov,88 
and VTB-VAB v Total Belgium of 23/4/2009.89 Most instructive, although also 
depressing, seems the parallel ‘interpretative turn to full harmonisation’ in the 
already legendary cases Laval90 and Rüffert,91 and their interpretation of the 
                                                 
83  Ibid., para. 33. 
84  Ibid., para. 3. 
85  Ibid., paras. 24, 25. 
86  More generally, Ch. Joerges, ‘The Bright and the Dark Side of the Consumer’s Ac-
cess to Justice in the EU`, Global Jurist Topics 1 (2001): No. 2, Article 1. 
87  Text accompanying notes 65-66 supra. 
88  C-402/03, Skov, [2006] ECR I-199. 
89  C-261/07, VTB-VAB v. Total Belgium, nyr. 
90  Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, avd.1, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, [2007] 
ECR I-10779. 
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Posted Workers Directive.92 
IV.2  Company Law: Co-Original Economic Freedoms and Political 
Processes 
The judgments in Centros,93 Überseering,94 Inspire Art,95 and Cartesio96 have 
been heralded by many proponents of a ‘privatisation’ of European private la-
was a powerful shift to regulatory competition as a new paradigm of the Euro-
pean economic constitution and has been heavily criticised by others, in par-
ticular, political economists, for precisely the same reason.97 We believe that 
both views misunderstand the normative merits, or, at least, the constructive 
potential, of this jurisprudence. We will not go into the manifold implications, 
let alone review the plethora of analyses which these cases have attracted,98 but 
we will instead focus on an aspect which is of fundamental importance for our 
argument, but has typically been overlooked:99 the interplay between the eco-
nomic freedoms, the legislative and the judiciary, which was generated by the 
political right of the European ‘market citizen’ in order to hold the national 
sovereign accountable for its legislation and to confront it with the politics of 
                                                                                                                                                     
91  Case C-346/06, Rechtsanwalt Dr. Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, [2008] ECR 
I-1989 
92  Directive 96/71/EC, OJ L 18/1996, 1.We refer to our critical comments in Ch. Joer-
ges & F. Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the “Social Deficit” of Euro-
pean Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, 
European Law Journal 15 (2009): 1, and Ch. Schmid, ‘From effet utile to effet neo-
libéral: A Critique of the new Methodological Expansionism of the European Court 
of Justice’, in Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond - Pat-
terns of Supranational and Transnational Juridification, ed. R. Nickel, RECON Re-
port No. 7, Oslo 2009, 421-446. 
93  Case C-212/97, ECR [1999] I-1459 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs - og Selskabsstyrelsen. 
94  Case C-208/00, ECR [2002] I-9919 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Com-
pany Baumanagement GmbH (NCC). 
95  Case C-167/01, Kanter van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire 
Art Ltd, [2003] ECR I,. 
96  Case.C-210/06, judgment of 16 December 2008, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, 
nyr. 
97  M. Höpner & A. Schäfer, ‘A New Phase of European Integration: Organized Capita-
lisms in Post-Ricardian Europe’, MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/4, Cologne 2007. 
98  Ch. Schmid (note* supra), part 3, section 1, subsection 1, chapter 3. 
99  See B. Trefil, ‘Centros und die Niederlassungsfreiheit von Gesellschaften in Euro-
pa’, EUI Working Paper Law 2003/9. 
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its neighbouring European jurisdictions. This right is, in our view, by no 
means to be understood as another example of partisanship of the integration 
project with neo-liberal economics, but, instead, as the co-original institution-
alisation in the European polity of private and political autonomy in the sense 
which Jürgen Habermas has developed this idea in Betwenn Facts and 
Norms.100 This, in our view, is the normative significance of the Centros-case 
law, but equally its practical weakness. 
The judgment in Centros concerns the core of the European legal acquis, 
namely, the freedoms of market citizens, which apply directly and ought, the-
refore, to take primacy over national law. The decision was widely praised as a 
milestone in the realisation of the market freedoms, as a contribution to the so-
called negative integration and to the opening up of regulatory competition; 
but it also has wider implications. 
A Danish married couple, Marianne and Tony Bryde, wished to import wi-
ne into Denmark. In order to do this, they planned to set up a company, but did 
not want to pay the fee of the DK 200,000 (28,000 €) that Denmark required 
for the registration of companies. In May 1992, they founded a private limited 
company in England, the now legendary Centros Ltd., and set up a subsidiary 
in Copenhagen – for none of these steps did they need the money that a regular 
registration in Denmark would have required. Unsurprisingly, the Danish 
authorities refused registration. The Brydes went to court. Seven years later, 
the ECJ handed down the following judgment to the referring Danish Højeste-
ret. It found, rightly, that: 
‘lt is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty for a Member State to refuse to 
register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the law of another 
Member State in which it has its registered office but in which it conducts no 
business where the branch is intended to enable the company in question to car-
ry on its entire business in the state in which that branch is to be created, while 
avoiding the need to form a company there, thus evading application of the ru-
les governing the formation of companies which, in that state, are more restric-
tive as regards the paying up of a minimum share capital.’101 
Did the Court permit the Brydes, in Gerhard Kegel`s well-phrased words,102 to 
‘cock a snoot’ at the law? Or, and this may be the case’s most popular reading, 
was it the ECJ’s intention to allow for a more efficient legal framework for 
                                                 
100  See the references in note 62 supra. 
101  Sentence 1 of the tenor of the judgment, ECR [1999] I-1947. 
102  In his editorial in Zeitschrift für Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (8) 1999 
(‘Es ist was faul im Staate Dänemark und anderswo...’). 
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company law in Europe?103 
Maybe the truth lies in the middle? What is so abusive, really, about setting 
up a company in another Member State with a seemingly more beneficial regu-
latory system? Should we not simply understand it – as the ECJ does – as the 
exercise of a right afforded to European citizens, a right which does, however, 
cede to legitimate regulatory concerns – foreclosing the concerns of those who 
warn against the superiority of economic against political reason. The ECJ did 
not push aside Denmark’s right to enact compulsory provisions dealing with 
company law. It placed Denmark under pressure to justify why Danish re-
gistration fees would better serve the protection of creditors, which, according 
to the Danish government’s presentation, was the object of the Danish legisla-
tion. The Court remained unconvinced, partly because foreign companies were 
allowed to set up branches in Denmark without having to pay a registration 
fee, while the registration of a branch of Centros had been forbidden by the 
Danish authorities on the grounds that it did not carry our any commercial ac-
tivity at the place of its first registration in the UK. 
There are obvious parallels to the jurisprudence on Article 28 TEU (now 
Article 41 Treaty of Lisbon), which since Cassis de Dijon, thus for some deca-
des, repeatedly found that Community law must preserve and respect national 
autonomy (‘autonomieschonend’), whilst national laws must pursue their legi-
timate regulatory interests in conformity with Community law (‘gemein-
schaftsverträglich’). In other words, Danish citizens have the right to test their 
national sovereign in a European court – the Brydes made use of their right. In 
the event that it is found to be in breach of European law, the Danish legislator 
is given the chance to amend its laws – and it has done so.104 The new regulati-
on, justified by legitimate concerns of the Danish government to secure tax 
demands, may be called into question again. 
Centros has not remained without consequences. The possibility that inte-
rested actors would try to test how far their new freedoms would reach and 
how much money they would save,105 was easily predictable Debate about the 
                                                 
103  See H. Muir Watt, The Challenge of Market Integration, note 51 supra with referen-
ces. 
104  See B. Trefil, “Centros und die Niederlassungsfreiheit von Gesellschaften in Euro-
pa”, EUI Working Paper Law 2003/9, <http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-9.pdf>, 3l et 
seq., referring to <www.retsinfo.dk> and the doubts about the solidarity of the Da-
nish ‘Sonderweg’. 
105  The most recent, again widely discussed, example is Case C-210/06, CARTESIO Okta-
tó és Szolgáltató bt, Judgment of 16 December 2008, nyr; there, the Grand Chamber, 
rejecting the views of AG Miguel Poiares Maduro, held that it makes a difference 
whether a company is moving out of its original jurisdiction or entering another one. 
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implications of Centros in terms of legal systematique was, however, dense – 
understandably so because this kind of explorations prepares the grounds for 
practically rewarding moves. It helps us to understand the following decisions 
better.  
In a reference for a preliminary ruling by the Federal High Court of 30 May 
2002 (Überseering),106 the ECJ was asked whether German law could prevent 
a Dutch plaintiff company from suing for over 1,000,000 DM by, firstly, 
restricting in § 50 (1) of its Zivilprozessordnung standing to those legally com-
petent (rechtsfähig) companies, and secondly, by prescribing that a company 
incorporated according to Dutch law could lose its legal capacity once it trans-
ferred its activities to Germany in a way which constitutes, according to Ger-
man law, a transfer of its ‘seat’ (Verwaltungssitz).107 In an internal market in 
which freedom of establishment exists as a right, such legal principles seem 
downright incredible.108 In Inspire Art,109 the ECJ continued its line of reaso-
ning, and established that the right of a company set up under English law to 
carry on business in the Netherlands should be respected in principle; only for 
‘good’ reasons, not accounted for in European secondary legislation, may this 
fundamental freedom be restricted.  
The Centros judgment found Denmark’s regulatory interests per se legiti-
mate. In the follow-up decisions, there was no need for the Court to discuss the 
limitations to the fundamental freedoms. But these questions have become inc-
reasingly pressing: How are the general reasons in favour of the ‘seat’ theory 
(Sitztheorie) – protection of creditors and of subsidiary companies; co-
                                                                                                                                                     
We also tried out to find out what had motivated the Hungarian Company to move the 
“seat/headquarters” of its activities (‘inter alia, in the field of human resources, secre-
tarial activities, translation, teaching and training’, para. 22) from Baja, Hungary, to 
Gallerate, Italy. It seems to us that the case was invented by a Hungarian law profes-
sor. This raises the question of why the Grand Chamber was ready to hand down such 
a judgment. It may have been motivated by the lively discussions and uncertainties 
over the reach of the principle announce in the Centros jurisprudence. 
106  German Federal Court, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 15 (2000): 412. 
107  See para. 45 of the Opinion of Advocate-General Colomer on 4 December 2001 for 
Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v. NCC GmbH. 
108  Eventually, the representation made by the German government that the plaintiff 
could have acted as a personal company without legal personality under German law 
(cited in AG Colomer`s Opinion at para. 55; see, also, Roth, ‘Internationales Gesell-
schaftsrecht nach Überseering’, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrens-
rechts vol (2003): 117 & 123 et seq.), will not suffice; poignantly E. Schanze & A. 
Jüttner, ‘Anerkennung und Kontrolle ausländischer Gesellschaften’, Die Akteinge-
sellschaft (2003): 30. 
109  Case C-167/01, U. v. 30.09.2003, Kamer van Koophandel v. Inspire Art Ltd.. 
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determination; the avoidance of double taxation – to be accounted for in the 
future? Not by invoking the seat theory! In Europe’s multi-level system, the 
latter will, in principle, be substituted by the ‘incorporation’ theory (Grün-
dungstheorie), although this theory, too, will have to undergo significant modi-
fications in order to conform with Community principles.110 
IV.3  Altmark Trans: Diagonal Conflicts in the European Multi-level 
System 
One of the most important characteristics of the Europeanisation process is that 
it disconnects what is traditionally considered ‘private law’ from its regulatory 
context. This is one of the inevitably disintegrative effects of integration, le-
gally rooted in one of the Community’s core principles: the EU’s competences 
are restricted to the fields enumerated in the Treaty. Amongst them, we find 
practically the whole field of regulatory law, and the Community has used 
these competences extensively. The real world, however, continuously brings 
up constellations in which the demarcation of competences in the Treaty does 
not correspond with real existing and interconnected regulatory problem con-
stellations. Typically, the European level is competent to regulate one aspect of 
a problem, while Member States remain competent to regulate another one. 
The term ‘diagonal’ is used to distinguish such constellations from, on the one 
hand, ‘vertical’ conflict resolutions in which Community law trumps national 
law, and from ‘horizontal’ conflicts which arise from differences among the 
Member States’ legal systems, and which belong to the domain of PIL, on the 
other.111 The term ‘diagonal’ conflicts captures a structural characteristic of the 
European multi-level system. Neither the European level, nor the national level 
                                                 
110  E. Schanze & A. Jüttner, ‘Annerkennung und Kontrolle ausländischer Gesellschaf-
ten. Rechtslage und Perspektiven nach der Uberseering-Entscheidung des EuGH-
Entscheidung “Inspire Art”’, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2003: 36 consider these con-
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similar vein, P. Ulmer, ‘Schutzinstrumente gegen die Gefahren aus der Geschäftstä-
tigkeit inländischer Zweigniederlassungen von Kapitalgesellschaften mit fiktivem 
Auslandsbesitz’, Juristen-Zeitung, 54 (1999): 662. 
111  Ch. Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Per-
ceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutionalist Perspective’, European Law 
Journal 3 (1997): 378; Ch. Schmid, ‘Vertical and Diagonal Conflicts in the Euro-
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supranationalism ed. Ch. Joerges & O. Gerstenberg, (European Commission COST 
A 7 EUR 18340, 1998): 185-191, with very limited resonance in the legal communi-
ty; but see Germany’s First Lady of sociology, note 115 supra. 
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is in a position to address a specific problem in its entirety: European and na-
tional actors are thus forced to co-ordinate. 
Examples are legion, even though they do hardly ever appear in the literatu-
re under the titles that we have suggeted. We restrict ourselves to one: 112 the 
Altmark Trans judgment of 24 July 2003113 illustrates the implications of the 
privatisation114 of public services, induced by European law; these Europeani-
sed so-called ‘Services of General Interest’ or ‘Daseinsvorsorge’ are contro-
versial because they meet with firmly embedded national regulatory traditions, 
expectations and interests. The regulations that they affect are not as much in-
tertwined with private law as they may be in constellations in which national 
private law pursues regulatory goals that may collide with some of the goals of 
European regulatory law. However, privatisation initiatives are a major con-
comitant of integration; they affect the realm of private law as they determine 
to what extent services can be assigned to the market. 
‘Daseinsvorsorge’ was brought under the auspices of public law upon the 
basis that it affected basic human requirements in industrialised times. The 
German term was coined by no less than Karl Jaspers before 1933. The fact 
that Ernst Forsthoff in 1938 re-applied the term in the context of administrative 
law115 is no argument as such. Daseinsvorsorge has gained social and democ-
ratic legitimacy in Germany and, albeit in different varieties, in many other 
countries.116 Critics, for example, the advisory committee of the German Fede-
ral Ministry of the Economy, would regard its protection by legal norms as an 
encroachment of/on the citizens’ economic rights to free participation in the 
cross-border transfer of goods and services.117 The Treaty of Lisbon, however, 
acknowledges ‘the place occupied by services of general economic interest in 
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the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and ter-
ritorial cohesion’ (Article 14, ex Article 16 TEC). Pertinent research has revea-
led the sensitive political effects of privatisation strategies118 – and it is safe to 
predict that these controversies will remain vivid??valid?. The ECJ seems to be 
well aware of all this. 
Altmark Trans concerned subsidies awarded to public transport underta-
kings in the Landkreis of Stendal in Germany. The case itself may seem in-
significant, but the ensuing questions are of fundamental importance: Should 
the availability of public transport be organised upon the basis of social welfa-
re and distributional justice or upon the basis of efficiency? Is this an openly 
political question to be decided by the German Laender/Länder and commu-
nes, or a legal question for Community law to answer? The ECJ exercised wise 
judicil restraint. It did not impose a political option but, instead, designed a 
legal framework which leaves room for political processes and decisions – and 
still protects European concerns. This is, it seems to us, the core message of 
the decision, which also brought up difficult questions of law concerning the 
interplay between secondary Community law and the German public transport 
law (Personenbeförderungsgesetz) as amended in 1995. Altmark Trans GmbH 
and Nahverkehrsgesellschaft mbH both sought to organise public transport in 
the Landkreis of Stendal in Sachsen-Anhalt, one of the German Länder. Alt-
mark had been licensed, and had its/the licence renewed by the Regierungsprä-
sidium, while the bid by Nahverkehrsgesellschaft mbH was rejected. The cent-
ral question of law occupying the ECJ was: Did the subsidies given to Altmark 
Trans after it had been granted the licencse to organise bus traffic in the Land-
kreis Stendal qualify as state aid within the meaning of Article 87 TEU (Artic-
le 107 Treaty of Lisbon)? If yes, then they would be subject to the Commissi-
on’s competences under the Treaty provisions on state aid. 
The Court’s response sounds like old-fashioned legal formalism: following 
its own case law, the Court finds that an official act does not constitute state 
aid within the Treaty unless it includes an ‘advantage’ to the beneficiary un-
dertaking. Advantages for the purpose of state aid exclude financial means 
provided by the state by way of compensation for the public service obligati-
ons undertaken by the service provider. But the Court goes further, operationa-
lising its own distinction by four criteria:119 (1) The recipient must be required 
to discharge clearly defined public service obligations; (2) The parameters of 
the calculated compensation must be established in advance in an objective 
and transparent manner; (3) The compensation must not exceed the costs plus a 
                                                 
118  P. Le Galès & A. Scott, ‘Die Wiederherstellung des Marktsubjekts’, Berliner Jour-
nal für Soziologie 19 (2009): 6. 
119  Case C-280/00 (note 113 above), paras. 89-95. 
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reasonable profit; and (4) Decisions are to be taken either after a public procu-
rement procedure or the level of compensation is to be determined upon the 
basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequa-
tely provided with adequate means of transport. 
These responses do bear some problems. They need to be further concreti-
sed and their implementation will be challenging. But they have high normati-
ve qualities: European law does not take a stand for or against the organisation 
of public services through national welfare states; it decides neither for nor a-
gainst the market. Instead, it puts justificatory pressure on national politics, 
and forces those who organise public services to explain how they fulfil their 
social mandate. It ‘constitutionalises’ the multi-level system so as to accom-
modate the decentralised exercise of formative (national) political freedom, 
whilst, at the same time, allowing for European concerns to afford market ac-
cess to non-local suppliers. And if this were to prove a successful solution 
which both guaranteed and manifested some social sense in national practices, 
then it would be an achievement that, to date, has remained hardly conceivable 
in most integrated political systems120 – a ‘proceduralised’ conflict solution 
par excellence. 
V.  Verba Docent: On the Procedural Legitimacy of the  
Europeanisation Process 
We will now try to bring the abstract deliberations in the first part and the 
analyses of the second part into a generalising synthesis. This will take three 
steps. The first is based upon the understanding of Europe as a multi-level sys-
tem and demonstrates its implications for integration policy. Normative de-
pendencies of political action become apparent in this process and are being re-
conceptualised, in a second step, in legal categories. In a final step, we will 
sketch out the legal constitution of the Europeanisation process itself, which, 
such is our claim, must be designed procedurally, in order to overcome the im-
passes of European law and the methodological nationalism in comparative 
law and PIL. 
                                                 
120  See M. Zürn & Ch. Joerges (eds), Governance and Law in Post-National Constella-
tions. Compliance in Europe and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
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V.1  Transforming the Analytics of Multi-level Governance into Legal 
Categories 
With the first step, we can simply repeat: Europe is no federation, but more 
than a regime. It can be analysed as a heterarchically structured multi-level 
system. Since powers and resources are located at various and relatively 
autonomous levels, the EU must, in order to cope with its functionally inter-
woven problem-constellations, organise its political action in networks. Politi-
cal activities will hence depend on the communication between the various 
relatively autonomous and, at the same time, mutually dependent actors and 
institutions.121 Jürgen Neyer formulated his thesis in a most concrete fashion, 
usually avoided by political scientists: the EU-specific conditions for political 
action favour a deliberative mode of communication that is bound by rules and 
principles, and where arguments are accepted only if they are capable of uni-
versal application.122 These observations have led political scientists to the 
conclusion that the European construct will strengthen the normative dimen-
sions of political interactions. If there is a kernel of truth in such an assump-
tion, the law can build upon the ‘facticity of normativity’. However, this is not 
to equate analytical, normative, and legal categories. What, instead, seems 
conceivable is to design legal frameworks which are likely to stabilise and to 
further the normative quality of political interactions, i.e., to transform strate-
gic action into a deliberative style of politics. 
This, however, is but a first bridging of political and legal science. To read 
into this exercise the insinuation of a transformation of the European Union 
into a deliberative democracy would, at best, be a sad misunderstanding. 
V.2  The Idea of a Three-dimensional European Conflicts Law  
How, then, may the law profit from the normative surplus of the European po-
litical system? We have to refer here to the systematic elaboration of responses 
to this query.123 Suffice it here to summarise some core points. As we have un-
derlined, the European multi-level system of governance must cope with hori-
zontal, vertical and diagonal tensions and conflicts.124 For this simple reason, 
we suggest that European law ‘is’ conflicts law. This law needs to emancipate 
                                                 
121  See III.1 supra. 
122  ‘Discourse and Order in the EU. A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Goveman-
ce’, Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (2003): 687; more detailed in his habili-
tation thesis, Postnationale politische Herrschaft, 2004. 
123  See references in note 59 supra 
124  Section III.1. 
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itself from the legacy of methodological nationalism. This is a functional ne-
cessity because the conflicts which it has to resolve cannot be decided by the 
choice of one national set of rules. This necessity generates at the same time a 
unique normative chance and vocation: to re-state the passage from which the 
whole conflicts-law construction departed: 
‘The legitimacy of governance within constitutional states is flawed in so far as 
it remains inevitably one-sided and parochial or selfish. The taming of the nati-
on-state through democratic constitutions has its limits. [If and, indeed, becau-
se] democracies pre-suppose and represent collective identities, they have very 
few mechanisms to ensure that ‘foreign’ identities and their interests are taken 
into account within their decision-making processes.’125 
European law is to compensate the democracy deficits of the nation state. This 
is its vocation and normative dignity, which the ongoing discussion on the so-
called European democracy deficit fails to capture. 
This starting point needs to be substantiated further in view of the variety of 
conflict constellations in the Union, its system of competences – and the fact 
that European integration is concerned not with laissez-faire polities, but with 
the mixed economies of welfare states. This is why European conflicts law has 
to develop two additional dimensions which accommodate the institutional si-
de of conflict settings. Its second dimension is concerned with the building up 
of transnational regimes such as comitology, which deal co-operatively with 
common problems. The third dimension is generated by the involvement of 
non-governmental actors in the management of public affairs. 
All of these three dimensions are present in Europe’s private law. There is a 
need for rules which institutionalise European markets and ensure their functi-
oning. It is as indispensable in European markets as in national markets to syn-
thesise the functioning of markets and the compensation of market failures by 
regulatory politics. It is equally indispensable to organise the co-operation of 
non-governmental actors and to supervise such involvement. 
                                                 
125  Ch. Joerges & J. Neyer, ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Politi-
cal Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, European Law Journal 3 
(1997): 273-299, at 293. In a very similar vein, see R. Howse & K. Nicolaїdis, ‘De-
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V.3  Constitutionalisation Through Proceduralisation 
We have underlined so far only functional reasons for the emergence of the 
second and third dimensions of European conflicts law, and postponed a dis-
cussion of its normative problems and potential. The functional argument is 
easy to defend. Modern markets are to be understood as social institutions. 
Private law, in the narrow sense, is as indispensable for their establishment as 
it is insufficient. The second and the third dimension of conflicts law are the 
transnational sisters of very general developments in the law of contemporary 
democratic societies. But is it at all conceivable that the normative qualities of 
the legal systems of constitutional democracies can be defended and reconsti-
tuted at transnational levels? 
The case studies in Section IV all resort mainly in the ‘first dimension’ of 
European conflicts law. They convey mixed messages: it seems clear to us that 
the ECJ’s product liability jurisprudence with it ‘maximum harmonisation’ 
doctrine is misconceived. This jurisprudence ignores the contexts in which lia-
bility law operates and which needs to be taken into account in any reasonable 
assessment of fault and liability, objective standards of negligence, the design 
of product safety legislation and of self-regulation (standardisation and certifi-
cation). The ECJ’s performance in company law seems to us to contrast positi-
vely in principle. Here, the Court pronounced clear and consistent orientation, 
on which secondary Community law as well as national legal systems can 
build. Most remarkably, in our view, is the conferral of political rights on the 
‘market citizen’, which mirror the co-originality of private and public autono-
my. The Court’s findings on the privatisation of public services appear equally 
productive. Legal traditions, social expectations, political preferences, and ad-
ministrative know-how and market innovation – all these are very different 
between Brittany and Estonia, between the Faroe Islands and Sicily but, ne-
vertheless, need to accommodate core European principles. 
The messages are diverging, but our conclusions point in one direction: Eu-
ropean law is ‘best’ when it recognises the difference between uniformity and 
justice, where/when it teaches us how to live with diversity. The implication of 
this insight is far-reaching. European integration must not abandon the project 
of integration through law. Law remains the only conceivable chance to dis-
cipline political rule, ensure political participation and protect human rights. 
However, the complexity and the dynamics of the integration process require 
the institutionalisation of continuous law-production (‘Recht-Fertigung’) ra-
ther than the elaboration of some comprehensive substantive corpus juris. 
‘Proceduralisation’ is the mode of law production, which has to ensure its 
normative quality, which has to build upon the inter-actions among the law-
producing actors, the intensity of societal scrutiny, and the capability of courts 
 36
and other legal fora to examine whether such law production ‘deserves re-
cognition’.59 This type of incremental efforts to settle the tensions inherent in 
Europe’s diversity, the discovery of fair solutions, the detection of failures and 
their subsequent correction, is maybe, both a challenge and a chance.126 
Epilogue: Conflicts Law, Proceduralisation and ‘Social Justice’ 
in Europe’s Private Law? 
Can we expect this mode of proceduralisation in European law to ensure the 
compatibility of open markets with regulatory concerns and promote social 
justice? ‘The Social Sphere/0’ in European private law is the focus of an ongo-
ing debate, which was not opened, but was significantly intensified by the 
‘Manifesto on Social Justice in European Contract Law’,127 which both of us 
have signed. We do neither retract our signatures nor engage here in a discus-
sion of the more recent pertinent contributions.128 The objective of our essay is 
distinct. We wish to underline three aspects, which are, in our view, not suffi-
ciently taken into account which have not, in our view, been sufficiently taken 
into account in the social justice debate. Our substantive concerns start from 
the conflict constellations in the European polity. Sensitivity to socio-
economic differences and respect of political and cultural diversity is a dimen-
sion of justice in European private law, to which our approach seeks a system-
atic answer. A related second concern is the decoupling of private law from its 
national regulatory environment. As indicated, markets are to be understood as 
social institutions which need a ‘visible regulatory hand’.129 Justice in the pri-
vate sphere cannot rely exclusively on the horizontal effect of fundamental 
rights. Its pursuit requires legislative and regulatory measures - not only at na-
tional, but also at European level. The third concern is with democracy: ss un-
derlined again and again, law production, ‘Recht-Fertigung’, in the Union has 
to operate in de-centralised arenas. The European legal system, its legislation, 
its regulatory machinery, and its courts are required to exercise mediating and 
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co-ordinating functions in Europe’s complex conflict constellations. Conflicts 
law and its procedural methodology are the counter-movement against the reli-
ance on self-governing markets, on the one hand, and the practices of de-
legalised quasi-political bargaining as under the so-called Open Method of co-
ordination, on the other. But is not precisely this somewhat indeterminate ref-
erence to contingent contexts the Achilles heel of proceduralisation, Joseph 
Corkin has objected.130 There is indeed no safe ground on which we could 
build – but we do not see a road to more safety. In the large and enlarging Un-
ion social and legal dis-embedding strategies and re-embedding efforts, moves 
and countermoves will not come to an end. The European jurist will have to do 
and be aware of exercise both, ‘Rechtswissenschaft in Kritik und als Kritik’ 
(Critique of legal science and legal science as critique).131 Rudolf Wiethölter’s 
formula captures and mirrors real world tensions and their controversial con-
ceptualisations. 
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